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1Introduction
This paper deals with various technical issues relating to the use of R&D statistics.
But these technical issues are of considerable importance in understanding R&D
performance, and therefore in identifying policy problems and policy objectives. The
basic problem follows from the use of ‘R&D intensity’ - meaning the R&D/Value
Added or R&D/Sales ratio - as an overall indicator for the manufacturing sector of
the economy, or for the economy as a whole. This particular measure has become
extremely popular as an overall performance indicator, and is frequently used by
policymakers, especially for international comparisons. However the indicator has a
serious weakness, which is that it reflects not just R&D performance, but also the
industrial structure in which R&D is carried out. So the indictor cannot be used - as it
frequently is - simply as a measure of relative R&D strength.
The OECD has recently attempted to correct for these problems, by developing and
indicator variously known as the OECD STIRD (Structural indicator of R&D) or
STIBERD (Structural indicator of business expenditure on R&D) indicator. This
note discusses these indicators, and argues that they continue to have significant
weaknesses because they do not adequately reflect the industrial structural
component of R&D intensity. The discussion here is based on two OECD
documents. One is Manufacturing Performance: A Scoreboard of Indicators1, where
the indicator is briefly explained and some empirical applications are presented. The
other is the STAN indicator note 1 (draft), 'Comparing Industrial R&D Performance.
STIRD: A New S&T Indicator to Complement National R&D Expenditure as a
Proportion of GDP plus National R&D Intensity Profiles'2, where the indicator is dis-
cussed more thoroughly at a theoretical level.
In the STAN indicator note a new S&T indicator of industrial R&D performance is
presented. The indicator is called STIRD, for Structural Indicator of R&D. It is
constructed to take explicit account of 'the different industrial structures of different
countries'.
STIRD is intended to be a complement to GERD/GDP, i.e. gross expenditures on
R&D as a proportion of GDP, which is 'the most widely used indicator of aggregate
(i.e. economy-wide) technological performance' (p. 1). A basic problem with the
GERD/GDP indicator, however, is precisely that it does not take account of
differences in industrial structure across countries. Given the fact that R&D
intensities vary considerably across industries, the GERD/GDP indicator will to a
large extent reflect simply the industrial structure of a given country, rather than how
well it performs technologically in the industries that it actually has, i.e. in the
production it actually engages in. Or, more accurately, it will always reflect both
these aspects, but it will not tell us how much is due to the one and how much to the
                                                
1
  OECD, Manufacturing Performance: A Scoreboard of Indicators, OECD Documents,
Paris: OECD 1994, pp. 51-57.
2
  STAN indicator note 1 (draft), ’Comparing Industrial R&D Performance. STIRD: A New
S&T Indicator to Complement National R&D Expenditure as a Proportion of GDP plus
National R&D Intensity Profiles’, OECD, DSTI/STIID, June 1991.
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other of these two components. (Of course, these two components may be opposite in
sign, so to speak: a ’favourable’ industrial structure may be combined with a ’bad’ per-
formance in the different industries, or vice versa). It is, for instance, quite con-
ceivable that one country can have a higher R&D intensity (have a ’better
technological performance’) than another country in every single industry, and
nevertheless, owing to a ’less favourable’ industrial structure, have a lower
GERD/GDP figure than this other country. (We will here not go into a further dis-
cussion of the strengths and weaknesses of R&D intensity as an indicator of ’techno-
logical performance’.)
3The STIRD indicator
Let us now see how the STAN indicator note constructs the STIRD indicator. First,
total production of a given country is divided into the sum of the production of a
given number of industries. Second, there is defined a group of countries which are
to enter into the comparison. Next, we look at each individual industry separately.
We start with industry no. 1 and calculate the R&D intensity of this industry, defined
as R&D expenditures as a proportion of value added in the industry, in each of the
countries that we compare. We then calculate the average R&D intensity of industry
no. 1 over all these countries, where this average is a simple average, i.e. all countries
are weighted equally. In the same way, we go on to define the average R&D
intensities of all the other industries over this particular group of countries.
To calculate the score on the STIRD indicator for a given country, we take, for each
individual industry, the ratio of the R&D intensity of the country in question to the
average R&D intensity of the industry over the countries which enter into the
comparison. For each industry, that is, we calculate the relative R&D intensity of the
country in question when compared to this average. We then go on to calculate the
average of these relative R&D intensities over all industries, where the industries are
weighted by their output share (as measured by value added). STIRD of a given
country, then, is the weighted sum over all industries of these relative R&D
intensities, when the weights are defined by the output shares of the individual
industries.
In mathematical terms, STIRD of a given country k is defined by
STIRD
RI
av RI
VA
GDPk
i k
i G
i k
ki
= ⋅

∑
, ,
( )
where, for RIi k,  is the R&D intensity of industry i for country k, av RIi G( )  is the
average R&D intensity of industry i over the group of countries G, and 
VA
GDP
i k
k
,
 is the
share of the production of industry i in the GDP of country k.
Let us take an example. We start with the R&D intensity of total domestic
production. This total may refer to the GDP, in which case this intensity is expressed
by GERD/GDP, or it may for instance refer to total manufacturing production of a
country, in which case the R&D intensity will be expressed by total R&D
expenditures in the manufacturing sector as a proportion of total value added of the
manufacturing sector. Instead of GERD/GDP, let us use R D
VA
TOT
TOT
&
 as a more general
expression of the R&D intensity of total production, where R DTOT&  denotes total
R&D expenditures and VATOT  denotes total value added. This is also in line with how
the OECD itself envisages that the indicator in practice is going to be used. As stated
in the STAN indicator note (p. 3): ‘In practice, internationally comparable data for
R&D expenditures are not available for agriculture, mining and services. ....
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International comparisons at the industry level are therefore confined to business
enterprise expenditure on R&D within manufacturing. Consequently, the sum over
industries in STIRD must be restricted to manufacturing and GDP replaced by
manufacturing value added. The resultant indicator is thus a measure of relative
manufacturing industrial R&D performance and will be called manufacturing
STIBERD.’3
Now, let us imagine two countries, country A and country B, which have the same
R&D intensity of total production, but with different industrial structures. To give a
simple illustration, we make the assumption that the economies in question consist of
only two industries, industry 1 and industry 2. Industry 1 is an industry which
typically is characterized by low R&D intensity, while industry 2 typically is
characterized by high R&D intensity.
R DTOT&  is the sum of R&D expenditures in industry 1 and R&D expenditures in
industry 2, 21 && DRDR +  . Consequently, we have
TOTTOT
TOT
VA
DRDR
VA
DR 21 &&& +
=  .
Transforming this expression, we get
R D
VA
R D
VA
VA
VA
R D
VA
VA
VA
TOT
TOT TOT TOT
& & &
= ⋅



 + ⋅




1
1
1 2
2
2
Since the ratio of R&D expenditures to value added is the R&D intensity (RI), we
have
R D
VA
RI
VA
VA
RI
VA
VA
TOT
TOT TOT TOT
&
= ⋅



 + ⋅



1
1
2
2
 ,
or, in the general case with n industries,
R D
VA
RI
VA
VA
TOT
TOT
i
i
TOTi
&
= ⋅

∑  ,
i.e. R D
VA
TOT
TOT
&
 is the sum over all industries (in this case both industries) of the
products of the R&D intensity and the share of total output of each industry.
Let us suppose that both country A and country B have an R&D intensity of total
production of 5 %. However, country A has a higher R&D intensity than country B
in both industry 1 and industry 2, 1.875 % as against 1.0 % in industry 1, 17.5 % as
against 14.33 % in industry 2. On the other hand, country B has a higher share of its
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production in the high R&D intensity industry than country A. Country B has 70 %
of total output in industry 1 and 30 % of total output in industry 2, while for
country A the shares of industry 1 and industry 2 are 80 % and 20 %, respectively.
Thus, we can summarize the R&D intensities of total production of the two countries
in the following way:
Country A: =
TOT
TOT
VA
DR &
 ( ) ( )0 01875 0 8 0 175 0 2 0 05. . . . .⋅ + ⋅ =
Country B: =
TOT
TOT
VA
DR &
 ( ) ( )0 01 0 7 0 1433 0 3 0 05. . . . .⋅ + ⋅ =
The two countries have the same R&D intensity of total production. But since
country A has a higher R&D intensity than country B in both industries, we would
intuitively say that country A has a higher R&D intensity than country B when we
take industrial structure into account. In other words, we would expect country A to
have a higher STIRD than country B.
This is exactly what we get (given reasonable assumption of what the average R&D
intensities of the two industries are). Let us suppose that in a wider group of which
serves as a basis for the comparison, the average R&D intensity of industry 1 is 1 %
while the average R&D intensity of industry 2 is 15 %. Recall that STIRD of country
k is given by
STIRD
RI
av RI
VA
VAk
i k
i G
i k
TOT ki
= ⋅

∑
, ,
( )  .
We then get:
Country A: STIRD = 0 01875
0 01
0 8 0 175
0 15
0 2 1 73.
.
.
.
.
. .⋅
  + ⋅  =
Country B: STIRD = 0 01
0 01
0 7 0 1433
0 15
0 3 0 99.
.
.
.
.
. .⋅
  + ⋅  = .
Here the difference in industrial structure seems to be taken into account in the
following way: Both countries have the same R&D intensity of total production.
However, country B has an industrial structure which is more favourable from the
point of view of having a high R&D intensity of total production than country A.
This idea of how favourable an industrial structure is to a high R&D intensity of total
production can be given a fairly precise meaning. It can be expressed by the R&D
intensity of total production that a country would have had if it had the industrial
structure that it actually has, but in each single industry had the average R&D
intensity of the industry concerned over the countries which are being compared.
This ’structural element’ must somehow be ’subtracted’ if we want to take into
account the industrial structure of a country when we evaluate its R&D intensity
6 STEP rapport / report R-16/1994
performance: Taking this ’structural disadvantage’ into account, country A ’really’
does better  than country B.
However, in the STAN indicator note there is not only mention of taking differences
in industrial structure into account. STIRD is also said to reflect the allocation of
R&D expenditures across different industries (p. 2).
And, in fact, even if two countries have the same R&D intensity of total production
and the same industrial structure, they may still have different STIRD values. To give
a simple example, let us once again imagine two countries, country A, which is the
same as above, and country C. We still think of the economies as divided into only
two industries.
Both countries, then, have the same R&D intensity of total production, 5 %. Both
also have the same industrial structure, the industrial structure of country A in the
example above. But country C has a lower R&D intensity than country A in industry
1, namely 1.25 %, and a higher R&D intensity than country A in industry 2, namely
20 %.
Let us summarize the R&D intensities of total production of the two countries in the
same way as above:
Country A: =
TOT
TOT
VA
DR &
 ( ) ( )0 01875 0 8 0 175 0 2 0 05. . . . .⋅ + ⋅ =
Country C: =
TOT
TOT
VA
DR &
 ( ) ( )0 0125 0 8 0 2 0 2 0 05. . . . .⋅ + ⋅ =
Then, let us calculate the STIRD values of the two countries:
Country A: STIRD = 0 01875
0 01
0 8 0 175
0 15
0 2 1 73.
.
.
.
.
. .⋅
  + ⋅  =
Country C: STIRD = 0 0125
0 01
0 8 0 2
0 15
0 2 1 27.
.
.
.
.
. .⋅
  + ⋅  = .
We see that even though the two countries have the same R&D intensity of total
production and the same industrial structure, country A nevertheless has a higher
STIRD than country C. This should correspond to the case at the top of page 3 in the
STAN indicator note, where it is said that what in our example corresponds to
country A has a higher STIRD because ’it has a better R&D intensity performance in
the industries that account for relatively large shares of its output.’
STIRD, then, is an S&T indicator which is developed to take explicitly account of
the different industrial structures of different countries. However, it appears that
STIRD does not only take account of differences in industrial structure across
countries, but also of differences in allocation of R&D expenditures across
industries. Even if two countries have the same R&D intensity of total production
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and the same industrial structure, they will in general not have the same STIRD be-
cause STIRD also will depend upon how the R&D expenditures are allocated across
the different industries.
Clearly, these are separate dimensions. But what is the relationship between them?
Imagine we have two countries with the same R&D intensity of total production but
with very different STIRD values. Does this primarily reflect a difference in
industrial structure between the two countries, or does it reflect a difference in the
allocation of R&D expenditures across industries? Or rather, how much of the
difference in STIRD is due to a difference in industrial structure and how much is
due to a difference in the allocation of R&D expenditures across industries?
Obviously, just looking at the STIRD values will not tell us this. And is it even
possible that these two dimensions might work in opposite directions, so that two
countries which had both the same R&D intensity of total production and the same
STIRD nevertheless might differ considerably both in industrial structure and, but in
the ’opposite’ direction, in the allocation of R&D resources across industries?
It is thus not altogether clear what exactly the STIRD indicator measures. In order to
understand the issues involved better, we will in the following investigate the
indicator more closely. To anticipate, we shall see that there are some problems with
this indicator, and that the interpretation it is given in the STAN indicator note is
slightly inaccurate. Consequently, we will also have to revise the interpretation of the
examples given above.
Let us take a closer look at the STIRD indicator, then.
As above, we suppose as given a group of countries across which an average R&D
intensity is defined for each individual industry. Let us look at a particular country k
in this group. This country has a certain amount of total expenditures on R&D, and
accordingly a certain R&D intensity of its total production (e.g. GERD/GDP). Let us
assume these total  R&D expenditures, and consequently this R&D intensity of total
production, as given.
Now, given these total R&D expenditures, what kind of distribution of these R&D
resources across industries will give a high STIRD value and what kind of
distribution will give a low STIRD value? A result which we may find slightly
curious is that one will always get a higher STIRD value by reallocating R&D
expenditures from an industry with a higher to an industry with a lower average
R&D intensity. That is, given that the STIRD indicator is intended as a measure of
R&D performance, one would according to this indicator always ’perform better’ if
one does this.
It is easy to show this. Let us start with mathematical expression of STIRD, using the
notation in the STAN indicator note:
STIRD RI
av RI
VA
VA
i
i G
i
TOTi
= ⋅

∑ ( )
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Since we are here only concerned with one country, we choose to omit the subscript
k. We also choose to substitute GDP by the more general total value added, denoted
by VATOT  , which may refer both to GDP or to some other total production, e.g. total
manufacturing production of a country.
Now, the R&D intensity of a given industry i, RIi  , is defined by the ratio of the
R&D expenditures of the industry to the value added of the industry, R D
VA
i
i
&
 , where
the R&D expenditures of industry i are denoted simply by R Di&  .
Substituting the expression R D
VA
i
i
&
 for RIi  , we get
STIRD
R D
VA
av RI
VA
VA
i
i
i G
i
TOTi
= ⋅










∑
&
( )
Multiplying both the nominator and the denominator of the first fraction by VAi  , we
get
STIRD R D
av RI VA
VA
VA
i
i G i
i
TOTi
=
⋅
⋅

∑
&
( )
which reduces to
STIRD R D
av RI VA
i
i G TOTi
= ⋅

∑
&
( )
1
and we get
∑⋅=
i Gi
i
TOT RIav
DR
VA
STIRD )(
&1
Now, let us imagine two industries, industry e and industry f. The average R&D
intensity (i.e. over the countries which enter the comparison) of industry e, av RIe G( )
, is lower than the average R&D intensity of industry f, av RI f G( )  . In situation 1 the
R&D expenditures of industry e is R De&  , while the R&D expenditures of industry f
is R Df&  . In situation 1, we then get
STIRD
VA
R D
av RI
R D
av RI
R D
av RI
R D
av RII TOT G
e
e G
f
f G
n
n G
= ⋅ + + + + +


1 1
1
&
( ) ...
&
( )
&
( ) ...
&
( )  ,
where situation 1 is denoted by the subscript I.
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We now reallocate R&D resources of an amount a from industry f to industry e.
STIRD in situation 2 then becomes
STIRD
VA
R D
av RI
R D a
av RI
R D a
av RI
R D
av RIII TOT G
e
e G
f
f G
n
n G
= ⋅ + +
+
+
−
+ +


1 1
1
&
( ) ...
&
( )
&
( ) ...
&
( )  ,
where the subscript II denotes situation 2.
Our assertion above implies that STIRD in situation 2 must be higher than STIRD in
situation 1, or
0>− III STIRDSTIRD  .
This gives


 ++−++++⋅
Gn
n
Gf
f
Ge
e
GTOT RIav
DR
RIav
aDR
RIav
aDR
RIav
DR
VA )(
&
...)(
&
)(
&
...)(
&1
1
1
    0)(
&
...)(
&
)(
&
...)(
&1
1
1 >

 +++++⋅−
Gn
n
Gf
f
Ge
e
GTOT RIav
DR
RIav
DR
RIav
DR
RIav
DR
VA
 .
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by VATOT  , we get, since VATOT   is necessarily
positive,
Gn
n
Gf
f
Ge
e
G RIav
DR
RIav
aDR
RIav
aDR
RIav
DR
)(
&
...)(
&
)(
&
...)(
&
1
1 ++
−
+
+
++
    0)(
&
...)(
&
)(
&
...)(
&
1
1 >−−−−−−
Gn
n
Gf
f
Ge
e
G RIav
DR
RIav
DR
RIav
DR
RIav
DR
This reduces to
0)(
&
)(
&
)(
&
)(
&
>−−
−
+
+
Gf
f
Ge
e
Gf
f
Ge
e
RIav
DR
RIav
DR
RIav
aDR
RIav
aDR
which gives
0)(
&
)(
&
)()(
&
)()(
&
>−−−++
Gf
f
Ge
e
GfGf
f
GeGe
e
RIav
DR
RIav
DR
RIav
a
RIav
DR
RIav
a
RIav
DR
We are consequently left with
0)()( >− GfGe RIav
a
RIav
a
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or
GfGe RIav
a
RIav
a
)()( >
We now multiply each side of this inequality by 
a
RIavRIav GfGe )()( ⋅
 . Since this
expression is positive, we get
GeGf RIavRIav )()( >  ,
which is precisely the condition we presupposed.
In other words, given the total R&D expenditures of a country (or of the relevant
sector of the economy, e.g. the manufacturing sector), STIRD will always be higher
if R&D resources are reallocated from an industry with a higher average R&D
intensity to an industry with a lower average R&D intensity.
Let us now look closer into what kind of consequences this is likely to have. As we
have said, the STIRD indicator will reflect both the proportion of total R&D
expenditures to total production and how these R&D expenditures are distributed
across industries. It is the latter property which particularly concerns us here. The
basic point of departure is that R&D intensities vary considerably across industries.
Some industries have high R&D intensities, others have low, still others are in-
between.
Now, let us suppose that it is a fairly common situation that the R&D resources of a
country are too heavily concentrated in the high R&D intensity industries. Given
total R&D expenditures, it would be rational to reallocate some of these resources
away from the high R&D intensity industries and into the low intensity industries. In
this situation, the STIRD indicator would seem to work well: Given total R&D
expenditures, if some R&D resources are redistributed away from high R&D
intensity industries and into low intensity industries, STIRD will rise.
But let us now reflect on what a rational or reasonable distribution of R&D
expenditures across industries could be expected to look like. Surely, there is
absolutely no reason to believe that it would be an equal distribution in the sense that
R&D intensities were the same in all industries. Even a rational distribution of R&D
resources inevitably would have to be characterized by considerable differences in
R&D intensity across industries, reflecting considerable inter-industry differences in
conditions of production, market conditions, etc.
Now, the situation we postulated above, in relation to which we said that the STIRD
indicator would seem to function well, was one where the distribution of R&D
expenditures quite generally was considerably biased in favour of the high R&D
intensity industries. This, of course, would have to mean a distribution which
emerges as biased in this direction when measured against a hypothesized rational
Understanding R&D performance: A note on a new OECD indicator 11
distribution of R&D resources across industries, i.e. when measured against a
distribution which itself would have to be very uneven.
But suppose instead that the state of having a distribution of R&D resources which is
biased in favour of the high R&D intensity industries (i.e. a distribution which is
more unequal in this direction than would be rational), even if frequently met with, is
not an exclusively dominating state of affairs. Suppose, for instance, that this is the
situation in perhaps the majority of countries, but that in some countries this
distribution is quite reasonably balanced and that a few countries even have a
distribution which is biased too much in favour of the low R&D intensity industries.
If this should be the case, and precisely to the extent that some countries should
actually have a distribution of R&D resources which is biased in favour of the low
R&D intensity industries when measured against a hypothetical rational distribution,
the STIRD indicator may be quite misleading. If we once again imagine that we hold
total R&D expenditures to total production constant, the countries which have a
distribution of R&D resources too much in favour of the low R&D intensity
industries will get a higher STIRD than if they had a reasonable distribution. Given
the ratio of total R&D expenditures to total production, STIRD simply does not reach
its maximum when the distribution of R&D expenditures across industries is reason-
ably balanced. It will not even reach its maximum when this distribution is perfectly
equal in the sense that all industries have the same R&D intensity. On the contrary, it
will not reach its maximum until all the R&D expenditures of the country are
concentrated in one single industry, namely the industry with the lowest average
R&D intensity (i.e. across the countries which enter the comparison. Now, of course,
in this case the R&D intensity in this industry would probably rise so much that the
average R&D intensity across the group of countries would rise as well. But this is
an extreme, even absurd, limiting case. Quite generally, we will think of the average
R&D intensity across the group of countries as given).
Let us sum up this point. The STIRD indicator reflects both the R&D intensity of
total production, i.e. the ratio between total R&D expenditures and total production,
and the distribution of R&D expenditures across industries. The relationship between
the R&D intensity of total production and STIRD is straightforward: given the
distribution of R&D expenditures, STIRD will rise when total R&D expenditures
rise. What we have considered is how the STIRD indicator varies with the dis-
tribution of R&D expenditures across industries, holding total R&D expenditures
constant. We found that the higher the share of R&D expenditures in industries with
a low average (i.e. across the group of countries) R&D intensity is, the higher STIRD
will be: STIRD will always rise when R&D expenditures are redistributed from an
industry with a higher to an industry with a lower average R&D intensity.
We now want to draw attention to an important implication of this conclusion. That
STIRD always will rise when R&D expenditures are redistributed from an industry
with a higher to an industry with a lower average R&D intensity means that this will
be the case irrespective of the share of each of these two industries in the total
production of the country. Whether the low R&D intensity industry in question
accounts for a large or a small share of total output of the country is of no
consequence.
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For instance, let us again postulate a country k belonging to a group of countries G,
and let us focus on two industries e and f out of a total of n industries. As above,
industry f has a higher average R&D intensity (across the group of countries) than
industry e. Now, let us suppose that industry f is a relatively high R&D intensity
industry, with an average R&D intensity of 10 %. It is also a very important industry
in country k, accounting for approximately 10 % of its manufacturing production.
However, the R&D performance of the industry in country k is not at all satisfactory.
The R&D intensity is well below average at only 7 %. Industry e, on the other hand,
is typically a low R&D intensity industry, with an average R&D intensity across the
group of countries of only 0.5 %. Also, in our country k it is a far less important
industry in terms of output than industry f, accounting for less than 3 % of total
manufacturing production of this country. However, the R&D performance of this
industry in country k is quite satisfactory. The R&D intensity industry e in country k
is 0.9 %, nearly twice the average across the group of countries. Nevertheless, it will
still be the case that country k will get a higher STIRD if R&D resources are
reallocated from the high R&D intensity industry f to the low R&D intensity industry
e. Whether the high intensity industry is actually far more important in terms of
output in country k than the low intensity industry, or whether the low intensity
industry already has a more than satisfactory R&D performance whereas in the high
intensity industry R&D performance is far behind average, makes no difference. This
seems quite illogical, and surely must be contrary to the intentions behind the
construction of the STIRD indicator.
In order better to understand what is happening here, let us now go back to the
definition of the STIRD indicator. In mathematical terms, we saw that STIRD of a
given country was defined by
STIRD RI
av RI
VA
VA
i
i G
i
TOTi
= ⋅

∑ ( ) .
Here the term VA
VA
i
TOT
 represents the industrial structure of the country in question.
However, we also saw that this expression could be transformed, so that STIRD also
could be written as
∑⋅=
i Gi
i
TOT RIav
DR
VA
STIRD )(
&1
 .
What is worth noting here is that in this expression the actual industrial structure of
the country is totally absent, so to speak. STIRD turns out to depend only on the
R&D expenditures in each industry, the average (across the group of countries) R&D
intensity in each industry, and total production of the country. It seems that, contrary
to what was claimed to be the rationale behind the construction of the indicator,
STIRD does not take explicitly account of differences in industrial structure across
countries.
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Of course, the industrial structure of the country will be one component which
influences the STIRD value. The important point, however, is that the industrial
structure is not explicitly taken account of.
To see this more clearly, let us take as an example the indicator which lies behind the
development of the STIRD indicator in the first place, namely the traditional GERD
GDP
indicator, or, in our more general terminology, R D
VA
TOT
TOT
&
 . STIRD was developed as
an ’improvement and complement to’ this traditional indicator precisely because this
indicator does not explicitly take account of the differences in industrial structure
across countries.
But of course, this traditional indicator can also be written in a form which gives the
impression that it, too, takes account of differences in industrial structure. In fact, as
we showed above, we have
R D
VA
RI
VA
VA
TOT
TOT
i
i
TOTi
&
= ⋅

∑  ,
i.e. R D
VA
TOT
TOT
&
 is the sum over all industries of the products of the R&D intensity of
each industry and its share of total output. Again, the term VA
VA
i
TOT
 represents the in-
dustrial structure of the country. But again, this only tells us that industrial structure
is one of the components influencing the R&D intensity of total production. Since
this term just disappears when the equation is transformed, industrial structure is, of
course, not explicitly taken account of. It would seem that the same has to be said
about the STIRD indicator.
What we would seem to have to demand of an indicator that claimed to take
explicitly account of differences in industrial structure was that industrial structure
was included in the indicator formula in such a way that it could not be eliminated
simply by a transformation of the formula. We will come back to this further below.
But before we do that, we want to reconsider the examples we presented at the start
of this note. There we imagined three countries, A, B and C, which all had the same
R&D intensity of total production, namely 5 %. We summarized their R&D
intensities in each industry, their industrial structures and their R&D intensity of total
production in the following way:
Country A: =
TOT
TOT
VA
DR &
 ( ) ( )0 01875 0 8 0 175 0 2 0 05. . . . .⋅ + ⋅ =
Country B: =
TOT
TOT
VA
DR &
 ( ) ( )0 01 0 7 0 1433 0 3 0 05. . . . .⋅ + ⋅ =
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Country C: =
TOT
TOT
VA
DR &
 ( ) ( )0 0125 0 8 0 2 0 2 0 05. . . . .⋅ + ⋅ =
We then calculated STIRD for each country:
Country A: STIRD = 0 01875
0 01
0 8 0 175
0 15
0 2 1 73.
.
.
.
.
. .⋅
  + ⋅  =
Country B: STIRD = 0 01
0 01
0 7 0 1433
0 15
0 3 0 99.
.
.
.
.
. .⋅
  + ⋅  = .
Country C: STIRD = 0 0125
0 01
0 8 0 2
0 15
0 2 1 27.
.
.
.
.
. .⋅
  + ⋅  = .
We see that country A has a higher STIRD than both country B and country C,
although all countries have the same R&D intensity of total production. Comparing
country A and country B, we said that since country A has a lower proportion of its
production in the high R&D intensity industry than country B, it has a ’structural
disadvantage’ in relation to B when it comes to having a high R&D intensity of total
production. Since the two countries nevertheless have the same R&D intensity of
total production, country A is seen to have a better R&D intensity performance when
differences in industrial structure are taken into account.
Comparing country A and country C, which in addition to having the same R&D
intensity of total production also had the same industrial structure, we said that,
quoting the STAN indicator note, country A had a higher STIRD than country C
because country A ’has a better R&D intensity performance in the industries that
account for relatively large shares of its output.’
None of these, however, are correct interpretations. This is not the way STIRD
works. What is essential here, on the contrary, is the following:
For every 100 units of total output, each of our three countries uses 5 units in R&D
expenditures. The distribution of these 5 units is 1.5 units in industry 1 and 3.5 units
in industry 2 in country A, 0.7 units in industry 1 and 4.3 units in industry 2 in
country B, and 1 unit in industry 1 and 4 units in industry 2 in country C. Given total
R&D expenditures and total production, this distribution of R&D expenditures across
industries is the only thing that affects STIRD, in the way that the country which
distributes the greatest share of these R&D expenditures to the industry with the
lowest average R&D intensity gets the highest STIRD, quite irrespective of what its
actual industrial structure is. The actual industrial structure of each country does not
affect STIRD at all.
Let us show this by means of yet another simple example. We postulate a country D
which has the same R&D intensity of total production as the other countries, i.e. 5 %.
It distributes its R&D expenditures across industries in the same way as country A
does, i.e. out of 5 units of R&D expenditures, 1.5 units go to industry 1 and 3.5 units
go to industry 2. However, it has an industrial structure which is quite ’the opposite’
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of country A’s, with only 20 % of its production in the low average R&D intensity
industry and the remaining 80 % in the high average R&D intensity industry. Given
these presuppositions, country D’s R&D intensity in each industry, industrial
structure and total R&D intensity can be summed up in the following way:
Country D: =
TOT
TOT
VA
DR &
 ( ) ( )0 075 0 2 0 04375 0 8 0 05. . . . .⋅ + ⋅ =
As we see, country D has an abnormally high R&D intensity in the low R&D
intensity industry, which however accounts for a small share of its total production,
while it has an unusually low R&D intensity in the high R&D intensity industry,
which accounts for a very large share of its total production.
Let us then calculate STIRD for country D:
Country D: STIRD = 0 075
0 01
0 2 0 04375
0 15
0 8 1 73.
.
.
.
.
. .⋅
  + ⋅  =
In accordance with what we have said, country D gets exactly the same STIRD as
country A.
This also means that country D has a higher STIRD than both country B and country
C, although all countries have the same R&D intensity of total production. However,
the reasons that we gave when we tried to explain why country A got a higher STIRD
than country B and country C, in terms of industrial structure and in terms of having
’a better R&D intensity performance in the industries that account for relatively large
shares of its output’, turn out not to be valid here at all. On the contrary, country D
has a far more favourable industrial structure from the point of view of having a high
R&D intensity of total production than any of the other countries, and it has a very
poor R&D intensity performance in the industry which accounts for the dominant
share of its total output. Given its industrial structure, country D has a no less than
perverse distribution of its total R&D expenditures across industries. This, however,
is not at all reflected in the STIRD indicator. Given the R&D intensity of total
production and given the distribution of R&D expenditures across industries, STIRD
will remain the same no matter what the industrial structure of the country is.
And, in fact, we have shown in a general way above that given the total R&D
expenditures of a country, its STIRD will reach its maximum value when all the
R&D expenditures are concentrated in the low average R&D intensity industry. In
our example, given the average R&D intensity in each industry, and given an R&D
intensity of total production of 5 %, the maximum value that STIRD can get is 5.
This value it will get when all R&D expenditures are concentrated in industry 1,
irrespective of whether industry 1 accounts for 99.5 % of total production or 0.5 % of
total production (in which case the R&D intensity in this industry will be absurdly
high). This is the way the STIRD indicator works.
However, what we have just said needs to be qualified somewhat. We have said that,
contrary to what the STAN indicator note claims, the industrial structure of a country
is not reflected in the STIRD indicator. The STAN indicator note interprets a high
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STIRD value as expressing that the country in question has a good ’R&D intensity
performance in the industries that account for relatively large shares of its output’
(see for instance p. 3). We, on the other hand, have claimed that, given the R&D
intensity of total production, the only thing that determines STIRD is the distribution
of R&D expenditures across industries: the more of these R&D expenditures that
belong to industries with a low average R&D intensity, the higher STIRD will be,
irrespective of how large share of total output are accounted for by these industries.
Now, in all countries, although varying in degree from one country to another, one
will find that R&D expenditures are very unevenly distributed across industries.
Most of production is accounted for by industries with relatively low R&D
intensities, while industries with high R&D intensities account for a relatively small
share of production. Thus, if a country has a high STIRD compared to its R&D
intensity of total production, this means that it has a relatively high share of its R&D
expenditures in industries with a low average (across the group of countries) R&D
intensity. But since relatively low R&D intensity industries tend to account for the
larger share of total production, this means that there will be a tendency for countries
which have a relatively high proportion of its R&D expenditures in low average
R&D intensity industries also to have relatively high (given their R&D intensity of
total production) R&D intensities in industries which account for a large share of
total production.
Therefore, and here comes the qualification, empirically there will most likely be a
tendency for the STIRD indicator to work the way that the STAN indicator claims it
will. If a country has a high STIRD compared to its R&D intensity of total
production, this means that it has relatively high R&D intensities in industries with
low average R&D intensity. But precisely because of the tendency we noted above,
there will be a tendency that this also means that it has relatively high R&D
intensities in ’industries that account for relatively large shares of its output.’
However, this relationship is not in any way perfect. If total production is divided
into many individual industries, there will be a number of low R&D intensity
industries which account for a small share of total output, while some high R&D
intensity industries may account for a quite large share of total output. Exactly how
this will look will of course depend on how the industries are classified, for instance
on how many categories there are. But in any case there will be ample scope for
STIRD to take on values which are quite misleading in relation to what it is supposed
to measure.
A high STIRD relative to R&D intensity of total production, then,  may indeed
reflect that the country in question has a good ’R&D intensity performance in the
industries that account for relatively large shares of its output.’ However, it may also
to a large extent reflect unusually high R&D intensities in a small number of low
average R&D intensity industries which together do not account for a very large
share of total output. Thus, to what extent the STIRD indicator really measures what
it is supposed to measure and to what extent it reflects something else will be an
empirical question.
But anyway, the STIRD indicator is not sensitive to differences in industrial structure
across countries. STIRD is meant to measure R&D intensity performance taking
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account of the distribution of R&D expenditures across industries. If one country has
a larger share of its production in high (average) R&D intensity industries than
another country, STIRD does not imply that the first country should have a higher
share of its R&D expenditures in the high (average) R&D intensity industries than
the second country, corresponding to the difference in industrial structure between
the two countries. On the contrary, STIRD implies that both countries should allocate
their R&D resources in the same way, namely by concentrating as large a share as
possible of these resources in the low (average) R&D intensity industries.
It is also possible to think of another argument to the effect that STIRD empirically
functions reasonably well, an argument which we have briefly alluded to at the
beginning of this note. If one assumes that it quite generally is the case that the
distribution of R&D resources is too unequal in favour of the high R&D intensity
industries, so that a distribution which is too much in favour of the low R&D
intensity industries will virtually never be found in real life, a reallocation of R&D
resources from high R&D intensity industries to low R&D intensity industries will
always be rational, irrespective of the industrial structure of the country in question.
I.e., if in fact a distribution of R&D resources too much in favour of the low R&D
intensity industries is virtually never reached, STIRD may function reasonably well
even assuming that it does not take adequately account of differences in industrial
structure across countries.
To tell whether this is a reasonable assumption or not we would have to have an idea
of what a rational distribution of R&D expenditures across industries would look
like. This would have to be based on a thorough investigation of production and
market conditions in each individual industry. And here we would not only have to
take account of in which industries the R&D is performed, but also in which
industries the results of the R&D are realized, for instance in the form of productivity
increases. R&D expenditures in one industry may result in the production of new
machines that augment productivity in other industries which use these machines.
This kind of inter-industry interaction may be crucial to consider if we are to get an
adequate idea of what would be a rational distribution of R&D expenditures across
industries.
However, for any given country, STIRD implies that the rational way to distribute
R&D resources across industries would be to allocate as much as possible of these
resources precisely to those industries where the other countries allocate least R&D
resources. This seems a bit perverse, though. There probably are very good reasons
for the distribution of R&D resources across industries being the way we almost
invariably observe it, with large variations in R&D intensities from one industry to
another, and with more or less the same industries having high, respectively low,
R&D intensities in each case. Even if it may be reasonable to believe that there in
many cases to some extent may be a too high concentration of R&D resources in
high R&D intensity industries, with a tendency to a certain neglect of low R&D
intensity industries, it nevertheless seems likely that a rational distribution of R&D
resources across industries will not be too different from the kind of distribution that
we in general actually observe. If this is indeed the case, it would seem that one
cannot be so sure of virtually never meet with a distribution of R&D resources too
much in favour of the low R&D intensity industries. And, as we showed above, to
the extent that this actually happens, the STIRD indicator may be quite misleading.
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An alternative indicator
To help us see more clearly what is involved here, let us try to with a different
indicator for adjusting manufacturing R&D intensity for differences in industrial
structures across countries.
We choose to use an indicator which on the face of it looks very similar to the
STIRD (or STIBERD) indicator, the only difference being that where the STAN
indicator is based on the ratio of the R&D intensity of the country in question to the
average R&D intensity across the group of countries in each industry, the indicator
we propose here is based on the percentage difference between the R&D intensity of
the country in question and the average R&D intensity across the group of countries
in each industry. Let us denote this indicator by STIdiff  , for structural indicator of
R&D expenditures based on percentage differences. In the notation of the STAN
indicator note, we thus have
( )STI RI av RI VA
VAdiff i i G
i
TOTi
= − ⋅

∑ ( )  .
For each industry, we take the difference between the R&D intensity of the industry
of the country in question and the average R&D intensity of the industry over the
group of countries. Then we multiply this difference with the share of total value
added of the country in question accounted for by this industry. Lastly, we sum these
weighted differences over all industries. If the country in question on (weighted)
average has an R&D intensity above average in the individual industries, the
indicator will be positive. If it on (weighted) average has an R&D intensity below
average in the individual industries, the indicator will be negative.
Let us look closer at this expression. Multiplying by VA
VA
i
TOT
 inside the parenthesis,
we get
STI RI VA
VA
av RI
VA
VAdiff i
i
TOTi
i G
i
TOTi
= ⋅


− ⋅

∑ ∑ ( )  .
Now, since RI R D
VAi
i
i
=
&
 , where R Di&  is the R&D expenditures of industry i, we
have
STI R D
VA
VA
VA
av RI
VA
VAdiff
i
i
i
TOTi
i G
i
TOTi
= ⋅


− ⋅

∑ ∑
& ( )
and
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∑∑ 



⋅−=
i TOT
i
Gi
i TOT
i
diff VA
VARIav
VA
DRSTI )(&  .
Since the sum of R&D expenditures in each industry over all industries obviously
equals total R&D expenditures in all industries taken together, this gives
STI R D
VA
av RI
VA
VAdiff
TOT
TOT
i G
i
TOTi
= − ⋅

∑
& ( )  ,
where R DTOT&  is total R&D expenditures in all industries taken together. Now,
R D
VA
TOT
TOT
&
 is nothing but the R&D intensity of the total economy or sector we are
dealing with, which in this case means the manufacturing sector as a whole. We will
denote the R&D intensity of the total by RITOT  . We may thus write the indicator
based on percentage differences as
STI RI av RI VA
VAdiff TOT i G
i
TOTi
= − ⋅

∑ ( ) .
This expression allows us fairly clearly to see what determines the magnitude of the
indicator based on percentage differences. The indicator depends, in the first place,
on the total manufacturing R&D intensity of the country, which is our point of
departure. This is then modified by the subtraction of a magnitude which is an
expression of the industrial structure of the country in question. This structure
expression, av RI VA
VAi G
i
TOTi
( ) ⋅
∑  , which is the manufacturing R&D intensity the
country would have had if, given the industrial structure that it actually has (the set of
VA
VA
i
TOT
 ‘s), it in each industry had an R&D intensity equal to the average R&D
intensity in the industry across the group of countries entering the comparison. Thus
we see again, but from a different angle, that if a country in each individual industry
has an R&D intensity equal to the industry average R&D intensity across the group
of countries, the indicator will take the value 0. If a country has an industrial
structure characterized by a relatively large share of manufacturing production in the
industries which on average have a high R&D intensity, the expression
av RI
VA
VAi G
i
TOTi
( ) ⋅
∑  will be relatively high, which means that the country in
question will have to have a relatively high total manufacturing R&D intensity to get
an indicator value above zero. Conversely, if a country has an industrial structure
characterized by a relatively high share of manufacturing production in the low R&D
intensity industries, the expression av RI VA
VAi G
i
TOTi
( ) ⋅
∑  will be relatively low,
which means that it will suffice with a relatively low overall manufacturing R&D
intensity for the country in question to get a positive indicator value.
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Thus, the indicator based on percentage differences, as witnessed by the expression
 STI RI av RI VA
VAdiff TOT i G
i
TOTi
= − ⋅

∑ ( )  ,
equals the actual total manufacturing R&D intensity of the country in question minus
a term which expresses the industrial structure of the country. Now, rearranging this
expression we get
RI av RI
VA
VA
STITOT i G i
TOTi
diff= ⋅


+∑ ( )  ,
and substituting the first expression we gave of the percentage difference indicator
above, we get
( )RI av RI VA
VA
RI av RI
VA
VATOT i G
i
TOTi
i i G
i
TOTi
= ⋅


+ − ⋅

∑ ∑( ) ( )  .
With this last expression, we see that we get a decomposition of the total
manufacturing R&D intensity of a given country, where the total manufacturing
R&D intensity of the country can be expressed as the sum of two different
components. The first component, av RI VA
VAi G
i
TOTi
( ) ⋅
∑  , is an expression of the
industrial structure of the country, reflecting the share of , respectively, high R&D
intensity and low R&D intensity industries in total manufacturing production. The
second component, ( )RI av RI VA
VAi i G
i
TOTi
− ⋅

∑ ( )  , is an expression of how well the
country on (weighted) average performs compared to other countries in terms of
R&D intensity inside each individual industry.
Let us give an example of an empirical application of this decomposition.4 Using
data on R&D expenditures and value added in 22 manufacturing industries for the
year 1985 in 12 countries (USA, Japan, West Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy,
Canada, Australia, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), we found a relatively
high positive correlation of r = 0.67 between absolute size of economy, as measured
by GDP, and R&D intensity in the manufacturing sector. However, the correlation
between GDP and the industrial structure component of the above decomposition
was higher than this, with r = 0.74, whereas the correlation between GDP and the
R&D intensity within the individual industries component was lower, with r = 0.48.
And when we instead of GDP used Ln GDP as a measure of size of economy, we
found an even larger difference between the two components. The correlation
                                                
4
  See Tore Sandven and Keith Smith, ‘R&D and Industrial Structure in a Comparative
Context”, Fremtek-notat 5/93, NTNF Programme Future-Oriented Technology Policy, Oslo
1993.
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between Ln GDP and total manufacturing R&D intensity was moderately high, with
r = 0.53, whereas the correlation between Ln GDP and the industrial structure
component was very high, with r = 0.88 and the correlation between Ln GDP and the
R&D intensity within the individual industries component was very low, with
r = 0.19. This seems to indicate that the difference between large and small
economies in terms of manufacturing R&D intensities is more a reflection of
differences in industrial structure between large and small economies than of
differences in R&D performance given the industrial structure that the respective
economies actually have.
We have said that the indicator based on percentage differences measures how well
the country in question on average performs in terms of R&D intensity within the
individual industries. As is plain from the expression
 STI RI av RI VA
VAdiff TOT i G
i
TOTi
= − ⋅

∑ ( ) , the value of this indicator does not depend
on the distribution of R&D resources across industries. The only place in the
expression where the R&D expenditures of the country in question enter, is where
total R&D expenditures are divided to total value added. Apart from this, the
indicator only depends on the industrial structure of the country. This seems quite
reasonable as long as we want to adjust for industrial structure. But as with all aver-
ages, this too may, on the one hand, be an average of reasonably equal figures, or, on
the other hand, of a highly unequal distribution. In the latter case, of course, the
average will not tell us much and may even be highly misleading. Thus, if we want
to say something about the distribution of R&D resources across industries, we must
add other measures and descriptions.
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Conclusion
The indicator of R&D intensity adjusted for industrial structure based on percentage
differences,
( )STI RI av RI VA
VAdiff i i G
i
TOTi
= − ⋅

∑ ( )  ,
we saw could be written as
STI RI av RI VA
VAdiff TOT i G
i
TOTi
= − ⋅

∑ ( )  .
This indicator adjusts for industrial structure, but says nothing about the distribution
of R&D expenditures across industries. This is easily seen from the last expression.
If we hold total manufacturing R&D intensity constant and vary the distribution of
R&D expenditures across industries, we see that this does not affect the value of the
indicator whatsoever. On the other hand, still holding total manufacturing R&D
intensity constant, if we vary the industrial structure, the indicator value will change
accordingly, and in a quite reasonable and logical way. A country with a
comparatively large share of its production in low R&D intensity industries may still
have a high R&D intensity indicator value even though the R&D intensity of the
manufacturing sector as a whole is comparatively low. Most likely this will come
about because the country quite generally has an above average R&D performance in
each individual industry. But it is, of course, also possible that it gets a high indicator
value because it has an R&D intensity far above average in a couple of industries
accounting for a rather small share of total production while performing below
average in the majority of industries accounting for the bulk of total production.
The OECD STIBERD or STIRD indicator,
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As we have shown above, the STIBERD or STIRD indicator does not depend on the
industrial structure of the country in question. If we again hold total manufacturing
R&D intensity constant, i.e. if we hold total R&D expenditures divided by total value
added constant, and vary the industrial structure, the indicator value is not affected
whatsoever. On the other hand, the STIRD indicator does depend on the distribution
of R&D expenditures across industries, as is again easily seen from the last
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expression above. Again holding total manufacturing R&D intensity constant, if we
vary the distribution of R&D expenditures across industries, the indicator will vary
accordingly.
However, as we have seen, the STIRD indicator adjusts for the distribution of R&D
expenditures across industries in a distorted way. Given total manufacturing R&D
intensity, the more these expenditures are concentrated in the industries which have
the lowest R&D intensities on average across the group of countries, the higher the
STIRD value gets, and it reaches its maximum when all R&D resources are
concentrated in the industry with the lowest average R&D intensity across the group
of countries.
Imagine that the STIRD indicator was to be used as a guide for R&D policy. Extra
resources of a considerable amount have been granted to support industrial R&D,
and the question is how these extra R&D resources should be allocated across
industries. Using the STIRD indicator as a guidance, the answer would be that all of
them should be allocated to the industry with the lowest average R&D intensity
across the group of countries. And this will be the case irrespective of how large or
small share of manufacturing production this industry represents, and irrespective of
how much R&D resources the country in question already has allocated to this
industry. (Of course, if the number of countries in the group is small and one of them
allocates atypically much R&D resources to this industry, the average R&D intensity
of the industry will rise and eventually it will no longer be the industry with the
lowest average R&D intensity. But this eventuality does not affect the general
argument put forward here.) This seems as bit perverse.
Now, in practice, things are not quite as bad as the above theoretical analysis
suggests, because there tends to be a negative correlation, although far from perfect,
between R&D intensity and share in industrial production at industry level, and
generally the low and medium R&D intensity industries together account for a larger
share of manufacturing production than the high R&D intensity industries. But on the
other hand, in countries like USA, Japan and Germany the medium and high R&D
intensity industries together account for a significantly larger share of manufacturing
production than the low R&D industries. There is thus ample scope for serious
distortion from the application of the STIRD indicator. And: the policy implications
of the STIRD indicator will be the same irrespective of the industrial structure of the
country in question. Whether the low R&D intensity industries account for a
relatively large (as in Finland, Denmark, Australia) or a relatively small (as in USA,
Japan, Germany) share of manufacturing production, the policy implications of the
STIRD indicator would still be that as much R&D resources as possible should be
allocated to the industries with the lowest average R&D intensities in the inter-
national comparison.
There is a general problem with the presentation of the STIRD or STIBERD
indicator in the OECD documents, for instance the STAN indicator note, namely that
the question of adjusting for industrial structure is not clearly distinguished from the
question of taking account of the allocation of R&D resources across industries.
Instead the STAN indicator note talks rather indiscriminately of adjusting for
industrial structure and of measuring the allocation of R&D expenditure across
different industries (cf. for instance the STAN indicator note, p. 2), as if the single
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STIRD indicator value somehow expresses both dimensions. But this will only be so
in the rather unproblematic and rather unrealistic case of no ‘statistical interaction’,
so to speak, i.e. where the relative R&D intensity performance of the country is
roughly the same in all industries, for instance, where it is about average in all
industries, or where it is an ‘equal distance’ above or below average in all industries.
But in the empirically relevant case of more or less pronounced ‘statistical
interaction’, where, for instance, the R&D intensity performance of the country in
question is approximately average in some industries, above average in some
industries, below average in others, far below average in some, etc., the two
questions should not be confused.
In conclusion, the OECD STIRD or STIBERD indicator has serious shortcomings as
an R&D performance indicator ‘that explicitly takes account of the different
industrial structures of different countries’ (STAN indicator note, title page). We
have seen that it does not in any meaningful sense adjust for differences in industrial
structures across countries. What it does reflect is differences in the allocation of
R&D resources across industries, but only, as we have seen, in a rather distorted
way.
As we have seen, the alternative structural indicator presented above, based on
percentage differences instead of the quotients which form the basis of the STIRD
indicator, adjusts for industrial structure in a quite reasonable and logical manner. A
better solution would then be to use this indicator to adjust for industrial structure.
However, this indicator says nothing about the distribution of R&D expenditures
across different industries. To take account of this distribution aspect, we would have
to supplement the indicator based on percentage differences with other descriptions
and measures. If we aim to express this distribution by means of a single indicator,
this should be constructed so that, given the total manufacturing R&D expenditures
of a country, it reaches its maximum value when there is a reasonable distribution of
R&D resources across different industries, not, as is the case with the STIRD
indicator, when this distribution is extreme and highly irrational.
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